OR.NET - Approaches for Risk Analysis and Measures of Dynamically Interconnected Medical Devices by  et al.
OR.NET – Approaches for Risk Analysis and
Measures of Dynamically Interconnected Medical
Devices
Franziska Kühn1,2, Martin Leucker1, and Alexander Mildner3
1 Institute for Software Engineering and Programming Languages, University of
Lübeck, Germany
{kuehn,leucker}@isp.uni-luebeck.de
2 Graduate School for Computing in Medicine and Life Science, University of
Lübeck, Germany
3 UniTransferKlinik Lübeck, Germany
a.mildner@unitransferklinik.de
Abstract
Nowadays, it lacks an open, standardized and dynamic interconnection of medical devices. All
existing combinations of medical devices consist of isolated solutions with proprietary interfaces,
as no common standards for networking and the exchange of data of medical devices exist. This
situation leads to confusing operating rooms and inefficient operations. Thus, new strategies need
to be developed for the authorization of dynamically interconnected medical devices. Primarily,
those concern of an acquisition and methodical adaption of new requirements and risks resulting
from this way of interconnection. The approach is to develop a method for a risk analysis for
interconnected medical devices, which is structured modular and consists of a risk assessment of
the standalone device and a risk analysis for the interconnection considering the risks involved
in the transfer of functions. When interconnecting the medical devices the risk analysis of each
of the devices is taken and they are compared by a gap analysis. Through this strategy it
will be possible to realize a standard-compliant dynamic interconnection of medical products,
which would be advantageous both for clinic operators and producers. This paper presents the
current situation of the authorization of combined medical devices and proposes a strategy for
the risk management of dynamically interconnected medical devices as a substantial part of the
authorization.
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1 Introduction
At present, the dynamic interconnection of medical devices poses as well legal as technical
challenges, especially for clinic operators. On the one hand most medical devices the clinic
operators would like to interconnect are not interoperable, on the other hand the connection
of medical devices (which have not been authorized together) leads to a self-production by
the clinic operator [3]. The clinic operators can choose all-in-one operating room solutions
from certain manufacturers, but often expensive and elaborate custom integration projects
are necessary. All of the possible combinations today consist of isolated solutions with
proprietary interfaces and have a limited flexibility and interchangeability, as no common
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Figure 1 Risk analysis and conformity statement today.
standards for networking and the exchange of data of medical devices to each other and to
adjacent IT-systems exist. This situation leads to confusing operating rooms and inefficient
operations.
The OR.NET-project1, funded by the federal ministry of education and research (BMBF),
focuses on the safe, secure and dynamic interconnection of medical devices in the operating
room and clinic. The project includes almost 50 project partners ranging over medical device
manufacturers, clinic operators, standardisation organisations and research institutes. Besides
the safe and secure interconnection of medical devices, the main goals are a standardised
solution for the interoperability of all medical devices and the possibility of interconnecting
arbitrary medical devices for clinic operators without taking responsibility for the resulting
system.
This paper shows the authorization of combined medical devices nowadays, which is
illustrated in Section 2. The content of Section 3 deals with our general idea of the
authorization of dynamically interconnected medical devices. The strategy for the risk
management of such systems as a substantial part of the authorization is approached in
Section 4. Conclusively the paper discusses the advantages of a dynamic interconnection of
medical devices.
2 Today’s Situation of Authorisation
Figure 1 shows the idea of the procedure for obtaining an authorization of today’s systems
and combinations.
The procedure is generally based on the assumption that the whole system is known
and the individual components have been developed for an interaction of each other. Either
the person establishing the interconnection declares conformity and is responsible for the
entire system or both producers of the medical devices allow the application with the other,
precisely specified device and document this option in the intended use of their own medical
device [4]. Approving all combinations of interest in advance is not possible because of the
enormous number of possible combinations. Another problem is that once a component
is replaced, a new conformity assessment procedure of the entire system must be worked
through. These obstacles for a dynamic interconnection of medical devices, especially from
different producers, lead to a large amount of not connected medical devices and thereby
to a confusing amount of control elements and monitors in the operating room as shown in
Figure 2.
3 Futures Authorization
A dynamic, open interconnection of medical devices with their hardware and software
components is not yet implemented in today’s authorisation processes. Thus, new strategies
need to be developed for the authorization of such systems. Primarily, those concern of
an acquisition and methodological adaption of new requirements and risks resulting from
1 http://www.ornet.org
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Figure 2 Operating room today.
Figure 3 Authorization of dynamically interconnected systems.
this way of interconnection [2]. Figure 3 shows the idea of the procedure for obtaining
an authorization of futures, dynamically interconnected medical device combinations. The
devices are authorized without knowledge of each other but with a defined interface. They
are connected by a safe medical IT-network (MIT), constructed and controled according to
EN 80001 [1].
4 Approaches for Risk Analysis and Measures
The aim is to develop a method to consider risks of a dynamic interconnection without
defining a specified connection partner. This method must be able to assess, evaluate, control
and document the risks additionally occurring by an interconnection. The structure of the
risk management is shown in Figure 4.
Risk analysis, -evaluation and -control is to be made separately for every medical device
in the combination. The producers do not longer allow the interconnection with only one
other, precisely specified medical product, but comply with a precisely defined interface. For
this reason it is necessary to precisely define the interfaces of the medical devices and certify
the respective medical devices including the interface specifications. The risk analysis of
each device is structured modular and consists of a risk assessment of the standalone device
(in accordance with today’s practices) and a risk analysis for the interconnection. The risk
analysis of the interconnection is developed by considering the risks involved in the transfer of
functions of the medical device to another one or the takeover of functions of another medical
device. These risks are transferred to a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [5] and
risk control measures are applied. The clinic operator is only responsible for a safe and
reliable network conforming to EN IEC 80001 [1] and for meeting the producers demands on
the network e.g. like a minimum bit rate and, if required, implement risk measures for the
interonnection defined in the FMEA of a certain medical device. When interconnecting the
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Figure 4 Risk management for dynamic interconnections.
medical devices the FMEAs of each of the devices are taken and they are compared by a gap
analysis. In that gap analysis the risks considered in the FMEAs for the interconnection are
compared by the clinic operator. If there are risks considered only in one of the FMEAs it
has to be checked if those mean additional risks also for the interconnected device. Only
if this is the case additional risk measures have to be taken to enable a safe and secure
interconnection.
5 Discussion
It lacks an open, standardized and dynamic interconnection of medical devices. This
interconnection would be advantageous both for clinic operators and producers. The clinic
operators could put together their ideal device combinations that would support their
operation flow best. An expected simplification of work processes would also lead to
monetary savings. In large medical technology companies the loss of proprietary interfaces
would lead to savings potentials, enabled by a simplified authorization and less needed expert
know-how. For small and medium businesses a standardized interconnection would open up
new business areas and they could have a better chance in the market if their devices could
interact with those of large producers. Simplified procedures and a reduced number of control
elements would relieve the operating room staff and increase patient safety. Merging data
sets from multiple devices would increase the quality of diagnoses and reduce the number of
required monitors.
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